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Abstract 
Young children who are called upon to donate regenerative tissue – most commonly bone marrow – to 
save the life of a sick relative are in a unique position. The harvest of tissue from them is non-therapeutic 
and carries the risk of physical and psychological harm.  However, paediatric donation is relatively 
common medical practice around the world. Where some doubt exists over the legality of allowing a child 
to donate, courts can be asked to authorise the procedure and in doing so will apply the ‘best interests’ test 
in making their decision. How are a young child’s rights recognised in such a situation? This paper 
considers whether the ‘best interests’ test is the ‘best’ test to be applied by courts when cases of potential 
child donors come before it. The approach of courts in three jurisdictions is analysed and problems in the 
application of the test in this context discussed. While the continued use of the test by courts is supported, 
the way the test has been used by courts is critiqued and recommendations made to better respect the 
rights of the potential donor child.  
Key words: Best interests, bone marrow donor, child donors, children’s rights, court cases 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
Children who act as regenerative tissue donors – providing bone marrow or peripheral blood 
stem cells (PBSC) – can potentially save the life of another. The great good that can come about 
through their participation is at the cost of donor children undergoing physically invasive and 
unnecessary medical procedures. The non-therapeutic element of their involvement raises legal, 
and ethical issues related to appropriate decision-making on behalf of children by parents, 
clinicians and courts, and child donors’ vulnerability in being exposed to physical and potentially 
psychological harm.  
This paper focuses on the appropriateness of the legal best interests test applied by courts from 
three jurisdictions – Australia, England and the United States – in applications for young 
children (i.e. children who are not ‘Gillick competent’)1 to be used as a tissue donor for the 
benefit of another. While it is acknowledged that applications before the courts are rare – with 
parental consent and/or legislative conditions being relied upon in the vast majority of 
circumstances – it is argued that these cases remain important. Increasingly, the medical and 
wider community has acknowledged that donor children have not been given sufficient attention; 
to date, their individual rights have not been the focus in the context of the sick recipient’s 
situation.
2
  These rare cases are therefore important for two reasons: firstly, the cases that come 
before the courts will be those that are most ‘controversial’ – there may be disagreement between 
parties, questions as to whether legislation can be satisfied or other uncertainties – as such they 
will be looked to as guidance by others when faced with similar situations. Secondly, today with 
an increasing focus on children’s rights – including rights to participation and increasing respect 
for children in the clinical domain
3
 – this impacts on how donor children are viewed. How courts 
treat them and how decisions about them should be made is therefore important. Since the wide 
adoption of the United Nations Convention of Rights of the Child (the ‘Convention’), the way 
children have been viewed within society has changed in most Western societies. While the 
United States is not a party to the Convention, the discussions in this paper of children’s rights to 
have their ‘best interests’ used as a guiding principle and their right to participate in decisions 
affecting them respected are not irrelevant to that jurisdiction.  
Generally, in the Western world, children are no longer solely viewed as recipients in a 
traditional welfare based model. Instead there is increasing acceptance of the need for child-
3 
 
centred approaches that recognise their rights – as identified under article 12 of the Convention – 
to be involved in decisions affecting them.
4
 Such an approach is more cognisant of a child’s 
individual interests as separate from their parents’ interests or the interests of others.  These 
rights extend to young, non-Gillick competent children.  The Committee on the Rights of the 
Child has stated that, ‘[c]hildren, including young children, should be included in decision-
making processes, in a manner consistent with their evolving capacities.’5 This is highly relevant 
in this context where a decision about whether a child should undertake a non-therapeutic 
procedure for the benefit of another is being made.  
Internationally, the best interests test is recognised in article 3 of the Convention as the 
appropriate standard to govern decision-making on behalf of children. Despite this, the standard 
has been much maligned, both generally and in this context. Difficulties arise in applying it 
where no physical benefit for the donor child exists and some physical harm is suffered.  
While there are arguably many rights under the Convention that might be applied in the child 
donor situation – i.e. the right of the child to physical integrity and dignity, to protection from 
harm, to have family relationships protected, etc. – the focus of this paper is on the child’s right 
to participate in court decisions (article 12) and the appropriateness of the best interest standard 
(article 3).   
Risks to Donor Children 
What are children subjected to in acting as donors? They will generally undergo blood tests, 
medical interviews, stay in hospital for a day, have a general anaesthetic under which marrow 
will be extracted via multiple needles from their hip bone, or else have catheters inserted into 
each arm or a central line placed to draw blood from their body, into a cell separator machine. 
The main risks are associated with complications of undergoing general anaesthetic, pain and 
infection at harvest sites and the possible need for blood transfusions.
6
 Other serious potential 
risk includes nerve, bone or tissue injury.
7
  Where ‘GCSF’ - a cell stimulating factor - is given 
prior to harvest this carries additional theoretical risks of increased likelihood of leukemia.
8
  
Studies show that while the risk of ongoing physical harm is rare, it is often the youngest and 
smallest donors that endure the biggest physical burdens with increased risks of cardiovascular 
complications and anaemia.
 9
 They are also more likely to need blood transfusions and undergo 
multiple tissue harvests.
10
  Less is known about the long-term psychological impact on children 
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with small scale studies of former child donors revealing conflicting evidence of psycho-social 
benefit or detriment experienced following donation.
11
    
It ought to be noted that in most, but not all, cases an unrelated tissue-matched donor may be 
available through the international network of bone marrow donor registries.
12
 However, for 
some people no equivalent ‘good’ tissue match will be available and use of an unrelated donor 
presents more logistical difficulties (i.e. timing of harvest or infusion in the recipient, transport of 
the tissue etc) than use of a sibling donor.  Generally, siblings - who may be young children - are 
looked to as potential donors prior to any search of the donor registries.
13
 
In this paper, Part 1 examines the best interests test from an ethical and legal perspective and 
outlines the role of courts in applying this test in deciding when a child may act as a regenerative 
tissue donor.  Part 2 goes on to examine the limited case law in the United States and Australia 
where courts applied the best interest standard when exercising parens patriae or a similar 
statutory welfare jurisdiction in deciding applications for young children to donate tissue. In 
England - where no such case exists - a comparative case involving an adult lacking capacity is 
considered. In Part 3, I argue that the best interests test remains the most appropriate standard for 
courts to use for child donor applications. Despite shortcomings, when applied correctly, it best 
serves to focus attention on the donor child’s interests, views and right to participate in decisions 
relevant to them. However, I remain critical of how courts have applied this legal standard in this 
context. 
Part 1: The role of the courts and the best interests standard 
The role of the courts 
Ordinarily a court will not be a party involved in deciding whether a child should act as a 
regenerative tissue donor.  This decision usually falls to the parents and medical practitioners of 
the child.  This approach is legally sanctioned (subject to conditions being met) in some 
jurisdictions through legislation,
14
 and in other jurisdictions is accepted as the medical norm and 
as being legally sufficient.  This means decision-making by these parties is usually the most 
important aspect for the majority of donor children (and, as will be shown, parental views do 
influence court decisions). Despite this, the focus here is on the less common cases where a court 
has been asked to decide whether a child should donate. Published judgments provide a unique 
and publicly available window into the factual scenarios that may arise involving child donors 
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and put what is usually a private medical decision into the limelight. The legal nature of the 
judgment gives the decision-making process a legitimacy that means it will likely be used as a 
reference point for medical practitioners, parents and lawyers in the future.
15
  As mentioned 
before, such judgments also provide a tangible way to assess whether, and in what fashion, 
children’s rights to participation in the legal setting are taken into account and how the ‘best 
interests’ standard has been interpreted.  
A separate question from this is whether mandatory court authorisation ought to be required 
before a child acts as a tissue donor.  While my own view is law reform requiring it may be 
warranted for certain groups of children (e.g. cognitively disabled children) or in certain 
circumstances (e.g. where there is a dispute between relevant parties – parent, practitioners, child 
etc), it is beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively consider and answer the difficult 
question of ‘when’ such applications should be made to the court. 
There are a number of situations where a court may be approached to provide authorisation: 
where legislative conditions cannot be satisfied; where no legislation is present or some 
uncertainty as to the legality of using a child as a donor in that specific instance arises; or where 
disputes between parents or health practitioners regarding a child acting as a donor arise.
16
  
‘Best interests’ as an ethical ideal and a legal standard 
The traditional ethical justification for allowing children to be used as tissue donors centres on 
such procedures being in the best interests of the donor child due to the potential psychological 
and social benefits accruing to the child.  The orthodox view of this standard focuses exclusively 
on the wellbeing of the donor child – where a holistic view of a child’s physical, psychological 
and social interests ought to be considered.
17
  Where child patients receive medical treatment, the 
relevant standard is for such treatment to be in the child’s ‘best interests’.  To apply this standard 
to a child donor, even though the child essentially undergoes procedures to provide treatment for 
another, is therefore consistent with the generally accepted approach.
 18
  
The application of the best interests standard may require decision-makers to attain an ‘ideal’.19  
For example, Beauchamp and Childress state: 
The term best is used because the surrogate’s obligation is to maximize benefit 
through a comparative assessment that locates the highest net benefit.
20
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This description of the standard accords with the mainstream view; it also mirrors the legal best 
interests test (discussed in the next section).
21
  The focus on the individual child’s best interests 
arguably ensures that the child’s interests are not subjugated to the interests of others and 
removes the threat of a child being exploited – this is a real concern in this non-therapeutic 
setting.  It also accommodates any ethical argument based on Kant’s imperative – that people 
should not be used as a means to an end.
22
  A compelling argument can be made that a donor 
child subject to the best interests test is not only being used as a ‘means’ but rather is being 
considered an end in him or herself.
23
  
The essence of the best interests ethical standard is reflected in the test applied by courts 
exercising welfare jurisdiction on behalf of children.
24
  Here, the scope of the best interests legal 
test that is referred to throughout the remainder of the paper is described and discussed.  
What then is the scope of this legal test?  It requires a Court to make an independent assessment 
of best interests for the specific child in question.
25
  Australia’s High Court has acknowledged 
that the phrase ‘best interests of the child’ is ‘imprecise’ at common law and no definitive list of 
factors exists to determine if it is satisfied in a given case.
26
  However, in some contexts 
legislation provides non-exhaustive lists of relevant factors to provide a framework for 
determining the best interests of an individual.
27
  In addition, as discussed below, one US State 
Supreme Court has developed more certain factors that require satisfaction before a finding of 
best interests will be made with respect to donation of bone marrow.
28
  
In all cases where the best interests test is used as the guiding principle, the test requires the 
welfare of the child to be the ‘first and paramount consideration’ by a Court exercising parens 
patriae or inherent welfare jurisdiction.
29
  The Courts will consider not only medical issues 
(including mental health),
30
 but also emotional and other welfare issues in deciding whether the 
test is satisfied.
31
 In making a decision a Court may consider the views of parents and health care 
professionals, however, it is recognised that parents, in particular, may have views ‘coloured by 
their own emotion or sentiment’.32 As such, the test applied by courts is an objective one that 
focuses on the child in question. In light of prevailing views regarding children’s participatory 
rights, the views of the child regarding issues (i.e. his or her view of their relationship with the 
proposed donor, how he or she feels about going into hospital for a procedure, etc.) should also 
be taken into account by a court.
 33
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Criticisms of best interests. Despite the best interests standard being the dominant standard for 
decision-making on behalf of children, many commentators have criticised its application by the 
courts.
34
  While some of these criticisms may seem dated, these arguments still apply to 
contemporary discussions of the standard. 
Some commentators consider that the best interests standard is used to ‘cloak’ decisions 
regarding children that have actually been made for other reasons.  Rodham argued in 1973 that 
the best interests standard was ‘not properly a standard’, rather it was ‘a rationalisation by 
decision-makers justifying their judgments about a child’s future, like an empty vessel into 
which adult perceptions and prejudices are poured’.35  This suggests that it may not be accurate 
to say that the standard is used to determine the question of whether a child can act as a donor, 
but rather the standard is used as a rationalisation after the decision has already been made.
36
  
However, determining if these criticisms are justified is difficult. 
Mnookin’s well known 1975 critique of why the best interests standard was flawed, or at the 
very least was very difficult for judges to use as a legal principle, still applies today.
37
 Relevant 
to application of the standard in this context, is the problematic nature of basing a decision on 
future eventualities – in this case, predicted beneficial relationships – rather than past acts; the 
need to assess relevant persons’ disposition and personalities to determine benefit rather than 
specific acts by those people; and the fact that the child, as the affected party, is often not a true 
participant in the process (a point I return to later in this paper).
38
 
In Brennan J’s 1992 dissenting judgment in Australia’s Marion’s case, he stated that the test did 
no more than to identify the person whose interests were in question.  It provided little guidance 
in identifying factors that are relevant to a determination of best interests:
39
 
[T]he best interests approach offers no hierarchy of values which might guide 
the exercise of a discretionary power to authorize [procedures], much less any 
general legal principle which might direct the difficult decisions to be made in 
this area by parents, guardians, the medical professional and courts... [T]he best 
interests approach depends upon the value system of the decision-maker…  
[creating] an unexaminable discretion in the repository of the power.
40
  
These criticisms gain particular traction where the proposed treatment is of no physical benefit to 
the child in question, as in the case where a child is put forward as a tissue donor for the benefit 
of another.  
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The best interests standard can also be criticised as unrealistic in focusing exclusively on the 
interests of the child in question in a situation so clearly of relevance to other family members. 
Crouch and Elliott criticise the standard as being largely inapplicable to real life situations where 
a child is being considered a tissue donor: 
The best interests standard is a formal and abstract framework; families are 
intimate...  The best interests standard is impartial; families are often partial and 
favoritist.  Most crucially, the best interests standard is applied to an individual 
shorn of his or her associations; families are, or can be, intimate collectivities.
41
 
This criticism has real merit in the donor setting where the usual affected parties are the parents, 
the sick child and donor child.  Expecting an impartial assessment of best interests by the parents 
in this context is, it is accepted, completely unreasonable if not impossible.  However, I argue 
that it remains relevant and applicable for an independent decision-maker such as a court.  
The inherent flexibility and vagueness of the standard means that the application of the best 
interests standard can take into account factors traditionally associated with other major ethical 
theories that do not place the individual’s interests as paramount; for example, some ethical 
theories prioritise the interests of the family over the individual members.
42
  When factors are 
imported from other ethical theories, they are often subsumed under the ambit of the best 
interests legal standard without explicit reference or explanation.   
This lack of clarity can also result in different methods being used in an attempt to satisfy the 
standard.  In contemporary English cases a ‘balance sheet’ approach of comparing and weighing 
the burdens and benefits of the proposed medical intervention has been used – most notably in 
cases involving treatment of sick children at the end of life.
43
 However, this approach has not 
been used in the child donor cases. In the donor context, it appears a number of different 
approaches to the legal test have been taken:  
Some... frame the equation exclusively in terms of harm to the donor: will the 
possible loss of a sibling cause more psychological or physical harm to the 
donor than the operation itself?  Others... have framed the analysis in terms of 
the benefits that they and the parents hope the incompetent will realize from his 
or her participation in the transplant.  Some... seek to balance the relative harms 
to which donors and recipients will be subjected, or alternatively, the relative 
benefits donors and recipient will realize.
44
  
It is also difficult to identify what factors need to be considered and given weight to, in order for 
the standard to be satisfied.  Given the obvious lack of physical benefit for a donor child that has 
healthy tissue removed, the benefit that accrues must be psychological or social.  Courts have 
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often struggled to demonstrate convincingly that the test is satisfied on the basis of psychological 
or social benefit.  However, this is arguably a failing of court judgments to date, rather than an 
inadequacy of the standard itself when properly applied. 
Relevant in this context are other ‘non-therapeutic’ procedures - such as involving children in 
non-therapeutic medical research - that have been justified by claiming the child will benefit.  
There a child is subject to invasive, although arguably minor, physical tests that are not directly 
for the physical benefit of the child. Some have argued that involvement in non-therapeutic 
medical research nonetheless benefits the participant indirectly and/or psychologically (e.g. 
through personal gratification, experience of pride in doing altruistic acts),
45
 or by contributing to 
the child’s moral development.46 Similarly, in the context of donation commentators have 
suggested that children may reap ‘existential’ rewards or gain ‘the virtues of altruism and social 
obligation’ through participation as donors.47 However, perhaps unsurprisingly, these rather 
vague justifications of ‘benefit’ to the child have been criticised.48  
In the context of related tissue transplants where the relevant relationship is likely to be between 
two child siblings, research does reveal that a child’s on-going relationship with a sibling 
profoundly influences them – both positively49 and, in some cases, negatively.50 Clearly benefits 
can flow to some when the sibling relationship is maintained; research shows that siblings often 
serve as role models, confidantes and provide social support with contact often maintained 
throughout their lives.
51
 A sibling death can also, understandably, be traumatic with this 
sometimes manifesting in children exhibiting anxiety, depression or aggression.
52
 
Cheyette summarises how the best interests test is usually satisfied for child donors:  
[P]ermitting the harvest ensures the child[’s]... psychological well-being by 
preventing the death of a sibling and by conferring on him or her the benefits 
associated with altruistic acts.
53
 
While some suggest that these benefits are speculative,
54
 satisfaction of the best interests 
standard on this basis is still the mainstream ethical and legal justification for children to act as 
tissue donors.
55
  Despite the criticisms, in Part 3, I argue that it remains the most appropriate test 
for courts to use in these cases.  
Part 2: Cases from Australia, England and the United States 
Application of the legal test in the context of tissue donation 
10 
 
Few courts have grappled with the issue of whether a non-Gillick competent child can be used as 
a bone marrow or peripheral blood stem cell donor for the benefit of another. This Part focuses 
on cases where applications to remove regenerative tissue from vulnerable persons were decided 
using the best interests test.
56
 Before the individual cases are discussed, common factors that 
appear from the cases are described.  
Factors relevant to courts applying the best interests test 
The factors considered relevant by the various courts that have decided tissue donation cases 
vary; however, some broad commonalities can be distilled. 
First, all the cases focus on the importance of the potential donor maintaining close relationships 
with the potential donor or (more rarely) another family member.  This requires courts to receive 
evidence about and ‘assess’ the nature of the relationships between potential donors and others.  
The cases in Australia and the United States consider the relevant relationship to be the one 
between the potential donor and the recipient; if this was considered a close relationship where 
the donor benefited from the association, both now and likely into the future (assuming the 
recipient lives), the court was more likely to find that the tissue removal procedure could be in 
the donor’s best interests.  However, as discussed below, in at least one English court has looked 
beyond the donor-recipient relationship and considered indirectly affected relationships that may 
be impacted by the recipient’s death.57 
Second, the courts make an assessment of whether the benefit to the potential donor outweighs 
the detriment of undergoing the procedure.  The courts in Australia and England have tended to 
look at the consequences of having the procedure versus not having the procedure.  In doing so, 
courts consider the possible medical risks, harms and side effects of proceeding as against the 
possible harms and distress caused to the donor by the recipient dying, and the potential 
psychological and social benefits of the recipient surviving. The US decision emphasised that 
psychological benefit is likely to be greater where a close relationship exists between the child 
and the intended recipient.
58
 
Third, GWW’s case in Australia made clear that where a potential donor is capable of expressing 
his or her wishes, those wishes should be taken into account by the court.
59
  While other cases do 
not expressly mention this factor, in some cases evidence was given that attempts were 
unsuccessfully made to explain the procedure to the potential donor.
60
  Today, in light of the 
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focus on child’s rights to participation recognised in article 12 of the Convention, the 
participation of a potential donor child and even young children should be sought in judicial 
proceedings and their views given weight appropriate to their maturity. Indeed, it has been made 
clear that an assessment of a child’s ‘best interests’ – as that concept is recognised under article 3 
of the Convention – requires respect for a child’s right to have their views heard and given due 
weight in matters affecting him or her.
61
  
Significant reliance is also placed on expert evidence provided by health care professionals to the 
court – in particular medical practitioners and psychologists.   
Having outlined the broad commonalities, the individual cases are now considered. 
Australia 
In Australia, the nation’s federated structure means that the Federal Family Court and the State 
Supreme Courts of each State and Territory have jurisdiction to deal with applications for 
children to become donors. In the past, only the Australian Federal Family Court has dealt with 
all applications for children to become donors.
62
 That Court is required to apply a legislated 
version of the best interests standard that relevantly includes taking into the account a child’s 
expressed wishes and consideration of the nature of a child’s relationships with other persons.63  
In the Marriage of GWW and CMW.
64
 In this case, a 9 year old boy was proposed as a donor for 
his aunt.  The child was represented separately enabling the Court to receive the representative’s 
view as to what was in the child’s best interests.  
From the non-exhaustive list of factors identified in the legislation as being relevant to a 
determination of best interests, Justice Hannon considered the most relevant to be: the wishes 
expressed by the child; the relationship between the child and the proposed recipient; and ‘any 
other factor or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant’.65 
Justice Hannon considered the ‘critical factor’ to be the relationship between the child and the 
intended recipient, his aunt.
66
  This was because: 
where there is a relationship between the proposed donor and donee and which 
is of benefit to the donor it is in the best interests of the child that the 
opportunity be given for the continuation of that relationship which may 
outweigh the risk or discomfort of a surgical procedure.
67 
 
While the direct relationship between the child and the aunt was not a ‘special relationship’, it 
was noted that his relationship with all members of his extended family was ‘close’.  
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Justice Hannon outlined the possible risks of undergoing both a bone marrow harvest and 
removal of PBSC via a catheter.  The judgment notes the minimal risks of undergoing general 
anaesthetic, the small risks of bruising, thrombosis or pneumothorax, the post-operative soreness 
and, where G-CSF is used to stimulate the production of cells, the possibility of fever and aching 
bones.
68
  The risk of a child developing myeloid leukaemia as a consequence of taking G-CSF 
was considered by the parents and Hannon J, on the evidence, to be ‘non-existent’.69 Recovery 
following the medical intervention was also noted as rapid. 
Significant consideration was also given to the child’s understanding and wishes, and the 
psychological effect if the authorisation was or was not granted.  While it was established that 
the child was an ‘intelligent young boy who has an understanding of what is involved’, based on 
the psychologist’s evidence, the child was not considered Gillick-competent.  However, 
importantly, the child’s views were still considered to be important.  The child had consistently 
maintained a wish to donate over a period of time, and had resisted attempts by his parents to 
dissuade him from participating.  Justice Hannon concluded that ‘the totality of the evidence in 
relation to his wishes leads me to conclude that significant weight should be attached to them’.70  
Justice Hannon accepted that the child understood the procedure was not ‘guaranteed’ to cure his 
aunt and that the child ‘would not consider himself responsible if his aunt were to die regardless 
of the transplant and that his grieving would be commensurate with the death of a close family 
member where the present circumstances did not exist’.71  In addition, the Court considered the 
anticipated negative effect upon the child if authorisation was refused.  This factor was noted as 
overlapping with the ‘critical factor’ of the relationship between the child and the intended 
recipient.
72
  It was stated that if the authorisation was not given, the child, ‘would be puzzled and 
confused at not being permitted to proceed as it would directly contradict his personal value of 
“helping”’.73 
On balance, Hannon J found that the psychological benefit to the child of donating outweighed 
the minimal risks and consequences of the procedure and he authorised the procedure as being in 
the child’s best interests.74  
The emphasis on the child’s understanding and wishes in this case is significant.  It clearly 
articulates that even in the case of children who are not yet Gillick-competent, their views will be 
considered seriously by the Court.  This approach seems correct - being one that is consistent 
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with the increasing respect given to children’s rights to be involved and participate in decisions 
affecting their lives.  Also significant, due to its absence from other similar cases, is that the 
Court gave specific consideration to the fact that the proposed donor understood that it would not 
be his ‘fault’ if the procedure was unsuccessful and the recipient died.  This would seem an 
important consideration in assessing whether psychological benefit or harm might be 
experienced by a donor child if a procedure is authorised. 
Re Inaya (Special Medical Procedure).
75
 In Re Inaya an application was made for a 13 month 
old infant to act as a donor76 for her seven month old cousin. An Independent Children’s 
Lawyer was appointed to represent the best interests of the child, and an amicus curaie was 
appointed to assist the Court.77 
Before describing the procedure and risks in detail, Cronin J prefaced this by stating: 
Aside from the risks associated with a general anaesthetic, the procedure of bone 
marrow harvest is “atraumatic” and not likely to have any long-term effects on 
Inaya.
78
 
The judgment then outlined the evidence about the bone marrow removal procedure itself; the 
main risks that were identified arose from the use of a general anaesthetic.  Justice Cronin stated: 
The risks posed by general anaesthetic are death, dental trauma and peripheral 
nerve injury.  There is no specific data detailing the risk faced by a healthy 1 
year old.  The medical evidence about the risk of death for Inaya, were she to be 
given a general anaesthetic, would be significantly less than 1:67,000.  I also 
accept the evidence that Inaya would face a 1: 10,000 risk of dental trauma and a 
1: 10,000 risk of peripheral nerve injury.  These are risks which parents consider 
and no doubt in most cases, take, every day of the week. 
The short-term side effects that Inaya may suffer following the general 
anaesthetic are post-operative nausea and vomiting, sore throat, bruising at the 
site of intravenous cannulation and behaviour or sleep disturbance.
 79
 
 
Under the heading ‘The psychological impact on Inaya’, Cronin J, like the Court in GWW, noted 
that the relationship between the proposed donor and intended recipient was ‘of particular 
importance’ to the psychological impact on the child.80  Evidence from a clinical psychologist 
specialising in child and family psychology was quoted by the Court in relation to the impact on 
the family and, as a consequence, on the child.
81
  However, it is not clear from the evidence that 
the psychologist adopted the same legal best interests test that focuses solely on the interests of 
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the child.  Justice Cronin’s judgment includes the following evidence from a psychologist that 
appears to show a more family-oriented relational view, than that of the individually focused 
legal best interests test:  
It is not just the impact on her, but the impact upon her as a member of a closely 
knit family unit, clearly driven by collective support that needs to be 
considered… [Inaya] should be allowed to be the donor for her cousin because 
this is the most likely intervention to save his life… [S]he should also be 
allowed to do so because as a member of this larger family unit, this is also what 
should be done.  The implication is that even the youngest family members need 
to be considered and decisions made appropriately...
82
 
It is not clear whether the Court accepted all the evidence of the psychologist, but it appeared to 
influence the Court’s conclusions regarding psychological benefit and harm.  By not articulating 
how it interpreted and applied the best interests test in this case, the Court opens itself to the 
criticisms (of the best interests test) outlined in Part 1.  
Evidence was given from the child’s father regarding his concerns about the negative impact on 
his child if the application were not granted.
83
  In this case the fact that the families of the 
children were part of a close-knit community and were living together was significant.  That the 
children would grow up ‘closely together’ was relevant, as Cronin J considered it to be in the 
interests of the child that their relationship be preserved if possible.
84
  Justice Cronin stated: 
Inaya may suffer psychological harm derived from guilt, self-blame and 
exposure to a traumatised and grief-stricken family and community, as well as 
the loss of important relationships if the procedure was not performed.
85
 
Orders were made authorising the procedure and the parents to consent to the procedure.  
While stressing the importance of the relationship between the intended donor and recipient, it is 
apparent that the Court took the traditional concept of what might be considered a ‘close 
relationship’ further.  In Re Inaya, while the families of the children were obviously close, the 
relevant children – aged 13 months and seven months – would arguably be unable to 
meaningfully value their relationships at that stage.
86
  Justice Cronin therefore relied on potential 
future benefit to a far greater degree than the Court in GWW.  Reliance on such speculative 
benefit when faced with certain physical harms and probable risks appears to stretch the notion 
of the best interests test.
87
 
It is also arguable that the Court appeared to take into account expert evidence focusing on issues 
not relevant to the legal best interests test.  The best interests test requires consideration of the 
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proposed donor’s interests; the intended recipient’s and family’s interests are only relevant to the 
extent that they affect the benefits or harms experienced by the proposed child donor.  However, 
the evidence quoted by the Court in this case appears to consider the welfare of the child in a 
much more family oriented manner; this is arguably at odds with the legal best interests test.  If 
the Court relied on this evidence, it would be relying on, to a much greater degree than in other 
cases, the notion of familial benefit, as well as individual benefit.  I return to this point in Part 3. 
United States 
In the United States, cases dealing with potential child donors occur at the State, rather than 
Federal, level and, as such, are only of precedential value in that State. Unlike in other countries, 
there is a history of cases where State courts have allowed organ transplants, including skin 
grafts (which could technically be termed regenerative
88
), from children.
89
 However, in the 
context of bone marrow or peripheral blood stem cell donation, the most pertinent case comes 
from the Supreme Court of Illinois’ decision in Curran v Bosze.90  It is suggested that where 
similar factual cases arose in other States, those courts would be likely to look at this case for 
guidance. Here, the Court applied the best interests test – unconstrained by a statutory definition 
– in determining the issues in accordance with the common law.   
In this case, the potential donors were twins aged three and a half.  In this appeal case the father 
of the children requested that both, or either, of the twins act as a donor for their half-brother, a 
12 year old boy with leukaemia with a different mother.
91
  A guardian ad litem was appointed 
for the twins and for the potential recipient in this case. The mother of the twins refused to 
provide consent to blood tests to determine compatibility and, in circumstances of compatibility, 
removal of tissue.  The mother had a ‘parentage order’ granting her sole care, custody, control 
and educational responsibility for the children but which provided that all matters of importance 
relating to health and welfare required consultation with the father.  The twins had briefly met 
their half-brother on two occasions.   
The Court identified three ‘critical factors’ which it considered necessary for a determination to 
be made that it would be in the best interests of a child to donate bone marrow to another: 
First, the parent who consents on behalf of the child must be informed of the 
risks and benefits inherent in the bone marrow harvesting procedure to the 
child.
92
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Second, there must be emotional support available to the child from the person 
or persons who takes care of the child… [This] is important to ease the fears 
associated with such an unfamiliar procedure. 
Third, there must be an existing, close relationship between the donor and 
recipient…  
Only where there is an existing relationship between a healthy child and his or 
her ill sister or brother may a psychological benefit to the child from donating 
bone marrow to a sibling realistically be found to exist…   [It] is the existing 
sibling relationship, as well as the potential for a continuing sibling relationship, 
which forms the context in which it may be determined that it will be in the best 
interests of the child to undergo a bone marrow harvesting procedure for a 
sibling.
93
  
The assessment of how psychological benefits can result is, in my opinion, correct; benefits can 
only ‘realistically’ accrue where an existing relationship is present.94  
The Court went on to identify the relatively low risks involved in undergoing the procedure.
95
  
However, on the facts, given that two out of the three ‘critical factors’ could not be satisfied96 – 
lack of support from the mother and the lack of a close relationship between the recipient and 
potential donors – the Court found that it would not be in the best interests of the twins to 
undergo any testing or subsequent procedure for tissue removal.
97
  
The requirement to fulfil the three critical factors before the best interests test is satisfied means 
that this approach is narrower than the cases discussed above,
98
 but arguably provides greater 
certainty (and thus overcomes some of the criticisms outlined in Part 1) than other donor children 
cases.  This approach avoids the problems of identifying in each individual case what the 
relevant factors are in satisfying the best interests case in these difficult cases where there is no 
physical benefit to the proposed donor. It goes some way to identifying exactly how 
psychological benefit ought to be assessed by a court. However, some question the meaning of 
the term ‘close’ relationship and the validity of the assumption underpinning the need for such a 
benefit, i.e. that psychological benefit (rather than harm) will automatically flow to those in 
established relationships.
99
  In addition, it is not clear what conditions need to be satisfied in 
order for a parent to provide sufficient ‘emotional support’.100   
The Court’s apparent deference to the mother’s views has also been criticised;101  Dufault argues 
that in circumstances such as these – where the mother is not related to the intended tissue 
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recipient – the Court ought to be ‘sensitive’ to the fact that a parent’s reasoning may be clouded 
and ought to decide the question of best interests itself.
102
 
The Court also offered no guidance as to how it would make a decision where both parents share 
care and responsibility of the children but disagree as to whether the children should be used as 
tissue donors.  The question remains whether one parent’s consent would be legally sufficient in 
those circumstances.
103
 
In addition, disappointingly, the Court failed to engage with the importance or relevance of 
allowing the twins to participate to the extent possible.  Unlike GWW’s case, the Court did not 
mention the issue of the potential donors’ understanding, nor discuss any attempts that were 
made to allow the children to participate.  While the children in Curran’s case were very young, 
it is suggested that some steps could still have been taken by the Court to determine whether the 
children had participated in any way.
104
  This would at least show the Court’s concern for the 
children as key participants, if not decision-makers, in this context and demonstrate a respect for 
children’s rights to participate as envisaged by the Convention (although it is noted that the USA 
remains one of the few countries who has not ratified the Convention).  
England 
In England, no reported cases of applications for a child to act as a donor exist.  Instead, 
guidance comes from a comparable case, Re Y
105
 (decided before the introduction of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005) where an incompetent adult was the potential donor.  There, the court 
applied the same best interests test that would apply if an application for an non-Gillick 
competent child came before a court.
106
  However, while commentators suggest that this case has 
relevance for children who are proposed as regenerative tissue donors,
107
 it is recognised that the 
relational differences are quite significant.
108
 A young child’s relationship with their sick relative 
– usually a sibling – is very different from where there is a long standing relationship between an 
adult lacking capacity to make the decision to donate and their adult sibling. In the latter case, 
the recipient may have a supportive role in helping the adult make decisions or assist them in 
other ways – something that is unlikely to be present between child siblings. The dynamic 
between parents of children and parents of adults who lack capacity is also different.  
Y, a 36 year old female, was severely mentally and physically handicapped and communicated 
mainly through signing.  The court accepted that Y did not understand that her sister (the 
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recipient) was ill, or anything about the proposed procedure.  The Official Solicitor was 
appointed as her guardian ad litem.  
The Court stated: 
The test to be applied in a case such as this is to ask whether the evidence shows 
that it is in the best interests of [Y] for such procedures to take place. The fact 
that such a process would obviously benefit the [recipient] is not relevant unless, 
as a result of [Y] helping the [recipient] in that way, the best interests of [Y] are 
served.
109
  
While the Court purported to use the same legal test, it adopted ‘a rather convoluted chain of 
reasoning’110 and was less explicit about the factors that led to its conclusion that the best 
interests test had been satisfied.
111
  Y’s relationships with others in her family were clearly an 
important factor in the Court arriving at its decision.
112
  However, the Court did not rely on the 
nature of the relationship between Y and the recipient; rather it relied on the effect the loss of the 
recipient would have on the relationship between Y and her mother.  The Court found that it was 
‘not possible accurately to describe the relationship between [Y and the recipient] as particularly 
strong’.113  However, the relationship between Y and her mother was ‘noticeably close’ with 
‘overt signs of affection’ by Y towards her mother.114 With the recipient’s death, Y would have 
less contact with her mother and, as such, be ‘harmed’.115  
Justice Connell stated: 
If the [recipient] dies, this is bound to have an adverse affect upon her mother 
who already suffers from significant ill-health... her ability to visit [Y] would be 
handicapped significantly, not only by a likely deterioration in her health, but 
also by the need which would then arise for her to look after her only 
grandchild... 
In this situation, [Y] would clearly be harmed by the reduction in or loss of 
contact to her mother.  Accordingly it is to the benefit of [Y] that she should act 
as a donor to her sister, because in this way her positive relationship with her 
mother is most likely to be prolonged.  Further, if the transplant occurs, this is 
likely to improve [Y’s]… relationship with her mother who in her heart clearly 
wishes it to take place and also to improve her relationship with the [recipient] 
who will be eternally grateful to her.
 116
  
Justice Connell weighed the social and psychological benefit in prolonging her ‘positive 
relationship with her mother’ against the ‘very small’ disadvantages to Y of undergoing the low 
risk procedure.
117
  The Court clearly relied on the indirect effect of the loss of the recipient’s life 
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to justify the best interests test.  The Court concluded that it was of ‘emotional, psychological 
and social benefit’ to Y to donate.  
The Court also quoted extensively from the US case of Curran v Bosze
118
 but did not make 
explicit which, if any, aspects of the case it agreed with in coming to its conclusion.
119
  
Re Y has been criticised on a number of fronts.  Some criticism correctly targets the apparent 
weak evidence relied upon by the Court.
120
  The evidence of psychological benefit (of 
proceeding) and psychological harm (of not proceeding) was not ‘particularly strong’ and not 
given by a person with appropriate expertise.
121
  The discussion of potential ‘risks’ to Y was 
inadequate and confusing.
122
 Also absent is the consideration of what, if any, emotional support 
would be provided to Y in undergoing any procedure.
123
  Most concerning is the lack of any 
close relationship between the donor and recipient. The reliance on an associated relationship 
results in a much broader conceptualisation of best interests than recognised in other cases.
124
  
This broader conceptualisation, relying on indirect social benefit, makes it far easier to justify 
donation by young children.  Despite the stated reliance on the best interests test, some consider 
that the Court, in not following the conditions in Curran v Bosze, allowed itself to take into 
account the needs of third parties (ie. Y’s mother and sister) in finding a psychological benefit to 
Y.
125
  
Summary of relevant cases. This section has discussed cases that applied the best interests test in 
cases where children (or a vulnerable adult) were proposed as a potential donor of bone marrow 
or PBSC. In all the cases independent representatives - tasked with determining the proposed 
donor’s best interests - were appointed for the individuals.  
While no uniform approach can be distilled, what is clearly important is an intimate relationship 
between the donor and recipient (despite the reasoning in Re Y); the support of parents to the 
child acting as a donor; and an analysis of the risks and benefits in going ahead or not going 
ahead with the donation. While only explicitly addressed in Re GWW, in today’s climate of 
increased recognition of children’s rights to participation, I would suggest that the wishes of the 
child where the child is able to express those views would also be crucial to a court today.  
The cases discussed in this Part are important in putting these children in the limelight and will 
inevitably be used as a reference point for medical practitioners, parents and lawyers in the 
future.   
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Part 3 draws upon these cases to assess the appropriateness of the courts’ application of the best 
interests standard in child donation cases.  
Part 3: Issues in the courts 
The best interests test: Alternatives, appropriateness and application 
Where cases involving child donors do come before the courts, their rarity means that courts 
need to be especially careful to provide clear judgments and good guidance for the future.  This, 
however, has not always been the case.  It is suggested that greater attention to a number of 
issues would result in increased clarity, confidence and, importantly, a better process for child 
donors.   
Despite the criticisms, I do not recommend replacing the current best interests test with another 
standard.  As a social institution that is viewed as legitimate by the majority of society in 
independently applying law to fairly make decisions the court is best placed to be able to apply 
this test that focuses on the individual child.
126
  Unlike parents – for whom the application of the 
best interests test may be impossible – an ostensibly impartial judge should be able to 
appropriately use this test. 
Rejecting alternative tests. One alternative legal standard that has garnered some support is the 
test of ‘parental reasonableness’ where a court assesses the ‘reasonableness’ of parental decision-
making.
127
  However, this moves the focus away from the donor child to an assessment of the 
parents.  It is essential that the child remains the primary focus, especially in child donor cases 
where so much attention can be given to the interests of the sick recipient. In addition, how a 
court would assess the ‘reasonableness’ of a parental decision is arguably just as vague and 
seemingly plagued by the same uncertainties as a determination of a child’s best interests.128  It 
would also be inconsistent with the Convention’s identification of the use of the best interests 
test as the appropriate approach.  
Another alternative, singular in its legal application, is the standard that the intervention should 
be allowed unless it would be ‘against the child’s interests’.129  While some argue that this 
approach is more consistent with what happens in reality, the lack of judicial uptake and support 
for this approach has left the meaning of the test unarticulated and uncertain.
130
  To refocus the 
attention from a procedure resulting in a net ‘benefit’ to the child (the best interests test) to one 
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that focuses on ‘harm’ to a child (against the child’s interests) is significant.  The threshold of the 
second test is arguably lower and will be wholly dependent on how the term ‘child’s interests’ 
are interpreted by the courts.  This test also moves to a position where a presumption almost 
appears to exist in favour of allowing a child to act as a donor – unless a reason can be found for 
it to be ‘against the child’s interests’.  As such, to replace one test with another lacking in any 
judicial consideration, of uncertain meaning and which lowers the threshold of when children 
can act as donors, seems ill-advised.
131
  To do so would appear to diminish the focus on the 
donor child’s individual rights in the most controversial cases that appear before the courts.  
Others have suggested that the substituted judgement approach ought to be adopted.
132
  The 
primary criticism of this approach is well articulated in the literature and relates to the difficulty 
in anticipating how a particular individual would make a decision, where that individual has 
never had capacity.
133
  As recognised in Curran v Bosze
134
 applying the test to children too 
young to express any view is illogical – how could the court as the surrogate ‘profess to know 
what decision that individual would make’?135  
Appropriateness of the current legal best interests test. The best interests test is essentially 
paternalistic, but its application in this context is appropriate if the court properly considers 
psychological benefit and harm, a child’s right to participate and have their views taken into 
account, and clearly articulates how it considers the test has been satisfied.  The rationale for this 
view will now be explained. 
In child donor situations, the concern is often that the rights and interests of the donor child will 
be forgotten in light of the plight of the sick relative – most often a sick sibling. Indeed, this is 
one of the reasons that the application of the best interests standard by parents is unreasonable – 
it being near impossible to divorce the concern of a sick child from that of a well child. However, 
the best interests test, when properly applied by an independent court, deals with this concern 
most effectively. A fundamental requirement of this test is that the focus remains solely on the 
benefits to the child in question. The wellbeing or otherwise of the recipient should only be 
relevant to the extent it impacts on the interests and wellbeing of the donor child.  
In addition, the increasing importance of children’s rights post-Convention, is something that can 
be recognised and accommodated within the best interests standard.  The right of a child to 
participate ought to be recognised and any views expressed by a child are now considered an 
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essential and potentially weighty factor for a court to consider in applying the legal test. The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child have emphasised that articles 3 (the child’s best interests) 
and 12 (the right of the child to be heard) are inextricably linked:
136
 
There is no tension between articles 3 and 12, only a complementary role of the 
two general principles: one establishes the objective of achieving the best interests 
of the child and the other provides the methodology for reaching the goal of 
hearing… the child. In fact there can be no correct application of article 3 if the 
components of article 12 are not respected.
137
  
Such an interpretation of the best interests standard is consistent with commentators, such as 
Eekelaar, who have reconciled the two approaches through the adoption of the concept of 
‘dynamic self-determinism’.138  This recognises that it is in a child’s best interests for the 
outcome to be ‘at least partly, determined by the child’ and that a measure of flexibility ought to 
be retained as the best course for a child may not always be able to be determined at the time of 
the decision.
139
  
Courts should be very clear that a significant factor will be the authentic views of the child 
where a child is able to express such views.  As noted by Robbennolt, ‘protecting the minor’s 
ability to decide is likely to advance the minor’s best interests’.140  This, of course, requires an 
assessment to ensure that the child has not been coerced.  If courts adopt this approach, conflict 
between the best interests test and the emerging autonomy of the child may be less likely to arise.  
This is because the application of the best interests test for children able to express a genuine 
view would, in the majority of cases, be likely to result in a decision respecting their views.
141
  
This is, of course, not guaranteed, but there would presumably need to be evidence of significant 
factors going against the genuinely expressed wish of even a young child for a court to make a 
finding against their wishes.
142
  
While in the past some commentators suggested that the best interests test would prevent a court 
taking into account altruism or compassion by a child,
143
 Re GWW shows that its application 
today does allow a child’s stated wish to be altruistic and compassionate for the sake of another, 
to be taken into account.
144
  Baron has suggested that the ‘use of the minor’s stated desire to 
participate as evidence of his best interests presents serious problems’.145  However, I disagree: 
courts are trained to weigh up evidence provided to them, and as long as sufficient safeguards 
and inquiries are made to ascertain the genuine nature of a child’s views, I fail to see the problem 
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in a court taking such expressed wishes into account.  Indeed, the Court in GWW showed how it 
is possible to do so.
146
  Family Courts in particular, already attribute differing weight to the 
expressed wishes of children subject to a court application - depending on the child’s maturity 
and understanding - and this is the correct approach. Indeed, taking into account a child’s views 
subject to their maturity is a legislated requirement for some family law proceedings (e.g. court 
determinations of residence/contact arrangements following parental separation) and also 
required under article 12.
147
 Where the child is younger but still able to express a view in favour 
of donating, independent evidence of benefit should also be needed, for example by 
demonstrating social or psychological benefit on the basis of close relationships.
148
   
What may provide a practical impediment to this approach is that courts – who rarely take 
evidence directly from children – may end up relying on reports from others who are asked to 
assess and ascertain the views of children (e.g. child psychologists acting as experts or family 
consultants).  As discussed later, reliance on expert evidence presents its own set of challenges.  
However, regardless of these challenges, it does not nullify the principle that courts should take 
children’s views into account in applying the best interests test.  
In cases where a young child is capable of expressing a view and expresses genuine objection, 
prior to or during a court application, the court should not authorise the removal of tissue.  
However, despite the view of some,
149
 I do not believe courts should take an objection at face 
value. Courts should attempt to distinguish ‘childish fears’ or reluctance (which it is 
acknowledged may be difficult to determine)
150
 from true objections and ought to be aware that 
for some children their objection may be given for reasons other than an actual opposition to 
undergoing the procedure to help a family member.  In such cases, sometimes the issue can be 
managed in such a way to allow the child’s true desire – to help their family member – be 
realised.
151
  Obviously, the more understanding shown by the child, the more weight should be 
given to their objection.  And, where such objection is consistently expressed, a child’s wishes 
not to participate ought to be respected.  
Where a child is unable to express a view due to their young age, the court must look to the other 
factors (i.e. evidence as to the nature of the relationship between the proposed donor and 
recipient such as whether they live together, how often they see each other etc.) in deciding 
whether the best interests test is satisfied. 
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Current problems in applying the legal best interest tests. Despite my view that the current best 
interests test is more appropriate and adaptable than other standards, problems undoubtedly 
remain in the courts’ application of the test in child donor cases.  Highlighted here are some 
concerns I have regarding the judicial application of the test.   
The inherent problem of the legal best interests test is how one determines its scope, and what 
should and should not be taken into account in assessing whether it is satisfied.  The unique 
circumstances of child donation – where a child undergoes a non-therapeutic procedure – makes 
the best interests test seem particularly difficult to apply.  Mumford aptly states the concern: 
[a]pplied strictly, it prohibits any kind of non-therapeutic medical intervention, 
for it cannot be said to be in the interests of an incompetent person to be 
subjected to the physical or psychological discomfort associated with bone 
marrow donation.  A wide interpretation of the best interests test runs the 
opposite risk: the test may be stretched or manipulated in order to achieve the 
results desired.  In the guise of the welfare test, risks may be taken with the 
health of those we should be protecting.
152
 
These points regarding the best interests test are, generally, true.  The attractiveness of the test – 
its flexibility in being able to take a range of diverse factors into account – is also one of its 
greatest flaws.  The lack of clarity by the courts in stating how the best interests test is satisfied 
in these types of cases, has only added to doubts over the adequacy of the test in this context.   
What is clear from all the cases is that the best interests test in this context will only be satisfied 
on the basis of psychological, and possibly subsequent social, benefit likely to be experienced by 
the donor child.
153
  Clearly, there is no physical benefit in undergoing the tissue removal 
procedure.  The courts have at times struggled to make a convincing case that the test has been 
satisfied.  As already discussed above, where the child is able to express a view as to his or her 
participation as a donor, the Court applying the best interests standard should take this into 
account. Other common criticisms relate to the question of how to assess such benefit and the 
arguably speculative nature of perceived benefits. 
First, where a court must rely on psychological benefit to satisfy the best interests test, Korins 
notes that, ‘the purely objective analysis of the best interest standard frequently breaks down due 
to the inherent subjectivity of all but the most rudimentary psychological evaluations.’154  This 
would appear to be particularly true for tissue donation cases as the empirical evidence of 
psychological benefit to the donor is, at best, inconclusive.
155
  While expert evidence given by 
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psychologists may bolster the evidence of psychological benefit, the courts’ reliance on such 
expert testimony is not without concern in some cases.
156
  This does not mean that the potential 
for psychological benefit cannot be taken into account, but as discussed below, the use of expert 
testimony in these cases brings an apparent scientific certainty to some cases which the court 
seems, rather dubiously, to be happy to rely upon to found their conclusions.
157
  Relevant to this 
point is my two-fold criticism of Re Inaya; in relying on speculative evidence and assuming that 
two infants of seven and 13 months would have a close relationship in the future, Cronin J 
stretched the concept of best interests by moving the focus from actual or imminent benefit to 
include hypothetical relationship benefits that may result far into the future.
158
 Justice Cronin 
also appeared to take into account evidence from a psychologist that took into account wider 
familial interests than is normally acceptable in the child-centred best interests test.  To avoid 
courts being subject to these types of criticisms, more clarity and transparency of reasoning is 
required in terms of how the court assesses and is satisfied that psychological benefit will accrue 
to the child in each case. 
Second, the courts have also been unclear as to what psychological effect on the potential child is 
being examined.  While the Australian and English cases seem to consider the psychological 
effects of donating compared with not donating and weigh this against the risks and harms of 
going ahead with the donation, many unanswered questions as to the nature of the benefit 
remain.  Does the psychological benefit of donating take into account that the transplant might 
fail?  Is it that the psychological harm suffered if the recipient were to die would be greater if the 
child did not donate rather than donate?  Is the degree of psychological benefit considered 
directly proportional to the closeness of the relationship between the donor child and the 
recipient?  Greater clarity regarding the questions the courts ought to consider is needed both for 
judges dealing with similar matters and also for those who intend to approach courts in the 
future. 
Third, there has been a lack of explicit consideration of certain factors that seem important in 
considering psychological effect on child donors.  In some cases, courts appear to almost assume 
the recipient’s survival;159 this assumption lends itself to a finding of benefit, despite the fact that 
recipient survival is by no means guaranteed.  More common has been the assumption that if the 
recipient survives this will automatically benefit the donor.
160
  While in the vast majority of 
cases this seems likely, this may not hold for every case of child donation.
161
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We lack empirical evidence about consequences for donors following transplant; no studies have 
provided sufficient evidence that the majority of child donors psychologically benefit from 
acting as donors.
162
  Research does show that the donor-recipient relationship can deeply affect 
seemingly ordinary sibling or other family relationships.
163
  Extrapolating from adult studies 
Cheyette notes: 
If a donor was at all ambivalent about donating, the recipient may forever hold it 
against him despite the fact the he ultimately came through.  The recipient's… 
guilt from having needed so great a sacrifice from the donor can also create an 
unbridgeable gap between the two family members. (references omitted)
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This is a concern echoed by Goodwin who suggests that ‘the potential for further conflicts with 
their siblings’ is ‘undervalued’ and ‘less contemplated’.165  The assumption of benefit made by 
courts (often in the absence of consideration of the (limited) empirical evidence regarding 
psychological outcomes or without testimony from former child donors
166
) means that there is a 
predisposition to the best interests test being satisfied.
167
  Arguably a more transparent approach 
would be to acknowledge the possibility of negative outcomes – not something that cases 
currently contemplate – but look at the weight of evidence that demonstrates the likelihood of 
benefit if the recipient survives. 
There has also been a tendency, when judges assess psychological effect, to not consider the 
effect on the donor if the transplant fails.
168
  The notable exception was Hannon J in GWW’s 
case.  Depending on the condition of the recipient, statistically the chances of failure can be quite 
high, with side effects like graft versus host disease being common.  If a recipient were to suffer 
severe complications or even die following transplant, it is a known phenomenon – recognised in 
the literature – for donors to potentially feel guilt or responsibility for such an outcome.169  Such 
a psychological burden experienced by donors is not usually taken into account by courts when 
balancing the pros and cons of undergoing a procedure. For an accurate application of the test, 
courts would, at the very least, have to weigh these risks of psychological harm along with the 
physical risks of undertaking the procedure.  Justice Hannon in GWW’s case at least recognised 
this possibility and received evidence that the child understood that if the transplant were to fail 
it would not be his fault.
170
   Others appear to have not considered this when applying the best 
interests test.
171
   
These psychological risks can presumably be ameliorated through emotional support (as 
recognised in Curran’s case), sufficient age appropriate information given to the donor both 
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before and after the transplant, and appropriate medical and psychological support where 
necessary. However, with the exception of Curran’s partial recognition of these steps, this is not 
something courts have explicitly considered or recommended for a child donor.
172
   
Fourth, the time period in which the child donor must experience a psychological benefit has not 
been well articulated by courts.  Grubb, in discussing Re Y,
173
 suggested that: 
[T]he court will look for immediate psychological benefit and would reject as 
too tenuous evidence of the long-term future benefit of not “living in a family 
under the shadow of avoidable, premature death”.174  
However, this seems at odds with Re Inaya, where Cronin J looked at the long-term potential 
benefit of the infant donor.
175
  Undoubtedly, the further the psychological benefits are predicted 
into the future, the more speculative and less reliable the psychological evidence appears.  
However, a balance needs to be sought here as not taking into account more than immediate 
benefits would see young children completely ruled out as donors, and this seems too 
restrictive.
176
  
Some guidance could be sought in addressing these four criticisms from the approach suggested 
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in their General Comment on article 3.
177
 There 
they note that assessing and determining the best interests of the child for every specific decision 
involves, concretely identifying the relevant elements in the best interests assessment – of which 
the child’s views will be one – and assigning weight to each one.  It also requires following a 
process with legal safeguards to determine the child’s best interests that includes the right of the 
child to be heard, the use of qualified professionals and the child accessing appropriate legal 
representation (a point returned to below).
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Reliance on expert evidence 
A further concern linked to the issues identified above has been the courts’ willingness to 
unquestionably rely on expert evidence in child donor cases.  Since child donation cases first 
appeared in courts in the United States in the latter half of the 20
th
 century, commentators have 
criticised the courts’ reliance on expert evidence.179   
While the courts’ acceptance of medical evidence regarding the procedure and risks is less 
problematic (assuming the information given to be evidence-based), a number of concerning 
issues arise in the Court’s unquestioning reliance on expert psychological evidence in child 
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donor cases.  While psychologists, or sometimes psychiatrists, are asked to assess a donor child’s 
capacity, they usually also give evidence regarding psychological benefit or harm to a donor 
child that contributes to the Court’s assessment of best interests.  It is this second task that can be 
problematic.
180
  
In Australia, England and the United States expert evidence may come before a relevant court in 
a number of ways. Whether the evidence is commissioned by the parties themselves, brought at 
the direction of the court or a court appointed representative of the child, it is likely to be 
influential on the decision made by the Court.
181
   
While evidence of psychological benefit or harm may inferentially be provided by a number of 
non-expert witnesses (i.e. relatives or carers), expert evidence arguably carries more weight as 
there exists the veneer of objective scientific certainty that may not be attributable to other non-
expert witnesses.  Jacobs notes that: 
the use of experts fosters societal trust in courts in general, and the acceptability 
and acceptance of a court’s particular decision.  Aside from giving an illusion of 
infallibility, reliance on experts underemphasizes the risks of errors of 
judgments.
182
 
One problem that arises in accepting evidence from a single psychologist expert (which seems 
common in some jurisdictions) is that such testimony, due to its seemingly objective nature, may 
be accepted as ‘fact’ without scrutiny. Despite the fact that all experts can be cross-examined, 
there is little evidence that this occurs in child donation cases where no dispute exists between 
parties as no contradictor may be present.
183
  The very nature of such expert evidence is that, 
inevitably, the psychological consequences of undergoing or not undergoing a procedure will be 
open to interpretation.
184
  Guidance has been developed in the context of psychological evidence 
given in divorce proceedings in the United States which state that: ‘Psychologists are encouraged 
to monitor their own values, perceptions, and reactions actively and to seek peer consultation in 
the face of a potential loss of impartiality.’185  This explicitly recognises that even expert 
witnesses are not immune from providing advice that is swayed by their own values and 
experiences.  The use of children as donors is a value-laden topic with differences of opinions 
common due to conflicting concepts of what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in a given situation.  It 
therefore seems likely that similarly trained experts may have differing views in the same set of 
difficult circumstances.
186
 (Although, this is admittedly a conclusion that may be made of 
different members of the judiciary as well.)
187
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It is also apparent that in providing evidence about benefit to the child, some experts have 
strayed beyond focusing on the donor child and given evidence about the family as a whole.  For 
example, in the Australian case of Re Inaya, Cronin J quoted the clinical psychologist’s evidence 
which contained statements which appeared to focus on the donor in the context of familial 
benefit – at odds with the focus on individual benefit required for satisfaction of the legal best 
interests test.
188
  An unanswered question for this and other cases is whether the expert intended 
the court to use their evidence in such a way.  The apparent reliance on such evidence in cases 
like Re Inaya raises questions about how courts are applying the best interests test.   
Use of such evidence can also lead to suggestions, like that of Jacob, who states that the judiciary 
might wish to look for a ‘scapegoat’, thus avoiding responsibility.189  Unlike Jacob, I am not so 
cynical as to suggest that expert evidence is so contrived.
190
  I do not believe that such evidence 
is used in courts to ‘confirm the resolution otherwise achieved, in ethical and legal dilemmas’,191 
i.e. that children should donate to a family member.  To do so would be to question more broadly 
the judiciary’s adherence to legal principle as the means of resolving difficult issues before the 
courts.
192
 Medical decisions in particularly, have always posed challenges for the court (i.e. 
withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from children; separation of conjoined 
twins; elective sterilisations of children with disabilities, to name but a few). While these 
judgments are open to criticism on a number of bases, I believe there is evidence of a weighing 
of factors and consideration and application of legal principle in all of the cases discussed in this 
paper.   
However, the cases do demonstrate that judges are heavily influenced by such testimony and 
rarely question the evidence,
193
 even when the evidence given is not consistent with the legal test 
purportedly applied (as was the case in Re Inaya).  This gives the appearance of unquestioning 
acceptance of such evidence, even when this may not in reality be what the courts are doing.  
This may in part be because courts are more comfortable making orders that are consistent with a 
consensus that has been reached between all parties (e.g. family members and health 
professionals) regarding what should occur.
194
  
In order to bolster confidence in the courts in these matters, first, experts ought to be required to 
more transparently outline their reasons when asked to make assessments of best interests of the 
child.
195
  Second, courts should outline more clearly what weight is given to the evidence and 
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how that evidence influenced the court’s decision.196  Testimony that did not address the test 
appropriately or which did not provide convincing reasons for the conclusions reached could 
then be expressly given less weight by a court and vice versa for well-founded expert testimony.  
This would also avoid the perception that expert testimony in relation to a child experiencing 
psychological benefit was being accepted as an undisputed ‘fact’ rather than simply the opinion 
of an expert.
197
 
Representation of children 
The representation of children (or lack thereof) in court cases involving potential child donors is 
another issue of concern.
198
  Research shows that in family law proceedings children can often 
feel marginalised and consider themselves not given a sufficient voice during proceedings 
affecting them.
199
 The way children, and their views, are presented in courts is another depiction 
of how much the law respects their autonomy and right to participate.  For countries who are 
party to the Convention, article 12(2) is clear that ‘the child shall… be provided the opportunity 
to be heard in any judicial… proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative…’.  
Given that children will rarely give direct evidence to the Court as a witness,
200
 how they are 
represented is crucial to the Court discovering their views.
201
  Normally, non-Gillick competent 
children in these cases are not directly represented in proceedings and instead a ‘best interests’ 
model of advocacy is used.
202
  In Australia, if the matter is before the Federal Family Court an 
Independent Children’s Lawyer may be appointed203 or, if the matter comes before a Supreme 
Court, a litigation guardian/tutor may be appointed.
204
  In England and Wales, a Children’s 
Guardian may be appointed and they will instruct legal representation on behalf of the child 
based on the Children’s Guardian’s view of the best interests of the child. (Rarely, a child may 
have independent legal representation who takes instructions directly from the child).
205
  In the 
United States, a court is likely to appoint a guardian ad litum for a child.
206
  These forms of 
representation for children - which provide for the appointment of separate legal representation 
for a child (e.g. Independent Children’s Lawyer) and/or the appointment of those with non-legal 
social work skills (e.g. Children’s Guardian)207 - require an appointed person to independently 
form a view as to the child’s best interests.  
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These appointments are often made at the discretion of the court and do not reflect a direct 
representation model.  ‘Best interests’ approaches like this have been criticised; Baron suggests 
that where such a lawyer is appointed, he or she: 
will make decisions based solely on his own investigations.  If, for example, the 
[lawyer] decides that the donor is likely to benefit, he will decide this question 
without the aid of adversary development of the evidence.  Because of this 
predetermination, the [lawyer] may not present the court with arguments and 
evidence that suggest that the [child] might not benefit.
208
 
There is evidence that appointed persons do not always directly engage with children; this can 
lead to children experiencing disappointment and distress.
209
  Keough also notes that his 
experience in the Australian family law context is that ‘many child representatives discount, 
editorialise or reject the child’s wishes, and argue the case in accordance with his or her own 
views of the child’s best interests’.210  The need for those appointed to faithfully and competently 
fulfil their role is crucial if children in proceedings are to benefit.
211
  While it is true that the 
court will consider all the evidence, the views of such a lawyer, appointed to represent a child, 
will inevitably be influential.
212
  
Another model, rare in its application, is the direct representation model.  Where used, this 
would see the lawyer advocate for the wishes of the child.
213
  While this may not be useful for 
many young child donor applications, there will be some cases where a potential donor child 
may benefit from direct representation.  This may be particularly so where there is a question as 
to a child’s competence or where a child holds particularly strong views and wants such 
representation.
214
   
In light of article 12 of the Convention, various sensible suggestions have been made regarding 
how processes in judicial proceedings involving children might generally be improved to further 
respect the participatory rights of children. These might suitably be adapted to apply in the 
relevant courts. For example, steps such as, the need for children to have age appropriate 
explanations of what is happening in court cases (including justification and explanation of the 
decision itself), be given options of how they can communicate their own views about the case, 
be told of how the information they give will be used and the use of qualified child focussed 
professionals for assessment processes.
215
 Furthermore, more globally, moves towards a model 
that allows for children to be present in proceedings and directly meet with the judge deciding 
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their case (if they wish) would provide more of a guarantee for children the subject of these 
hearings to participate in the decision.
216
  
Conclusion 
Young children acting as tissue donors continues to be a vexed issue.  While accepted medical 
practice, this unique situation of a child undergoing a non-therapeutic procedure for the benefit 
of another does not sit comfortably within the established legal or ethical frameworks governing 
decision-making on behalf of children.  The cases examined in this paper demonstrate how 
courts from different jurisdictions have, at times, struggled to convincingly apply the best 
interests standard. Given that the most difficult and controversial cases are likely to come before 
the courts, where the danger of exploitation of a young donor child may be the greatest, it is 
important for courts to clearly articulate their reasoning in applying this test. However, this has 
not always occurred. Questions remain about what factors are relevant in assessing a child’s 
proposed participation as a donor, how those factors are assessed and weighed and how expert 
evidence ought to be used in this context.  
Despite the approach of the courts in some of these cases being open to criticism, I have argued 
that the best interests test remains the most appropriate legal test to be applied by courts in cases 
where a non-Gillick competent child is proposed as a donor of bone marrow or PBSC.  
However, child donors who appear before a court would be better served if courts took steps to 
better articulate their reasoning and allow greater participation by the potential donor child. 
Ways in which this can be achieved would be to provide greater clarity regarding how the best 
interests test is satisfied in each case and better explain the relationship between expert evidence 
(in relation to psychological benefit/detriment) and the satisfaction of the best interests test. In 
relation to participation by child donors in court proceedings, the search for better ways for a 
child to be represented and have his or her genuine views presented to the court must continue.  
When such cases come before the courts, we owe it to potential donor children – even young 
children – to listen to their views and help them understand the decision made about whether 
they act as a donor.   
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